The news just broke out that Leon Panetta will be nominated to head the CIA and that Dennis Blair will be nominated to become Director of National Intelligence.
Now, on Panetta, the key line is right here:
Mr. Panetta has a reputation in Washington as a competent manager with
strong background in budget issues, but has little hands-on
intelligence experience. If confirmed by the Senate, he will take
control of the agency most directly responsible for hunting senior Al
Qaeda leaders around the globe, but one that has been buffeted since
the Sept. 11 attacks by leadership changes and morale problems.
Emphasis added. So, now we'll get as the head of the CIA a fabulous and capable . . . manager.
Great.
It doesn't get any better with Dennis Blair either:
Would bring to the job: Intimate experience with intelligence
during a 34-year Navy career. A brainy retired four-star admiral whose
jobs included commander of the United States Pacific Command, he is
also an Asia expert who is considered adept at running sprawling
organizations, seemingly a prerequisite for heading an office that is
still grappling with the task of fusing 16 spy agencies.
Doesn't sound too bad, right? Well, then there's this:
Carries as baggage: Had to step down as president of the
Institute for Defense Analyses amid concerns that his positions on
several corporate boards constituted a conflict of interest. The
Pentagon’s inspector general later concluded that he had violated the
institute’s conflict-of-interest standards by serving on the board of a
military contractor working on the Air Force F-22 jet while the
institute was evaluating the program for the Pentagon. The inspector
general found, however, that Mr. Blair did not influence the
organization’s analysis of the F-22 program. Another possible
hindrance: The selection of a retired admiral to the national
intelligence post could fuel worries about the militarization of
intelligence.
And there's this little tidbit from about ten years ago or so:
US officials say that this past April, as militia terror escalated, a
top US officer was dispatched to give a message to Jakarta. Adm. Dennis
Blair, the US Commander in Chief of the Pacific, leader of all US
military forces in the Pacific region, was sent to meet with General
Wiranto, the Indonesian armed forces commander, on April 8. Blair's
mission, as one senior US official told me, was to tell Wiranto that
the time had come to shut the militia operation down. The gravity of
the meeting was heightened by the fact that two days before, the
militias had committed a horrific machete massacre at the Catholic
church in Liquiça, Timor. YAYASAN HAK, a Timorese human rights group,
estimated that many dozens of civilians were murdered. Some of the
victims' flesh was reportedly stuck to the walls of the church and a
pastor's house. But Admiral Blair, fully briefed on Liquiça, quickly
made clear at the meeting with Wiranto that he was there to reassure
the TNI chief. According to a classified cable on the meeting,
circulating at Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii, Blair, rather
than telling Wiranto to shut the militias down, instead offered him a
series of promises of new US assistance.
According to the cable, which was drafted by Col. Joseph Daves, US
military attaché in Jakarta, Admiral Blair "told the armed forces chief
that he looks forward to the time when [the army will] resume its
proper role as a leader in the region. He invited General Wiranto to
come to Hawaii as his guest in conjunction with the next round of
bilateral defense discussions in the July-August '99 time frame. He
said Pacific command is prepared to support a subject matter expert
exchange for doctrinal development. He expects that approval will be
granted to send a small team to provide technical assistance to police
and...selected TNI personnel on crowd control measures."
Admiral Blair at no point told Wiranto to stop the militia operation,
going the other way by inviting him to be his personal guest in Hawaii.
Blair told Wiranto that the United States would initiate this new
riot-control training for the Indonesian armed forces. This was quite
significant, because it would be the first new US training program for
the Indonesian military since 1992. Although State Department officials
had been assured in writing that only police and no soldiers would be
part of this training, Blair told Wiranto that, yes, soldiers could be
included. So although Blair was sent in with the mission of telling
Wiranto to shut the militias down, he did the opposite.
Indonesian officers I spoke to said Wiranto was delighted by the
meeting. They took this as a green light to proceed with the militia
operation. The only reference in the classified cable to the militias
was the following: "Wiranto was emphatic: as long as East Timor is an
integral part of the territory of Indonesia, Armed Forces have
responsibility to maintain peace and stability in the region. Wiranto
said the military will take steps to disarm FALINTIL pro-independence
group concurrently with the WANRA militia force. Admiral Blair reminded
Wiranto that fairly or unfairly the international community looks at
East Timor as a barometer of progress for Indonesian reform. Most
importantly, the process of change in East Timor could proceed
peacefully, he said."
So that was it. No admonition. When Wiranto referred to disarming
the WANRA force, he was talking about another militia force, different
from the one that was staging attacks on Timorese civilians. When word
got back to the State Department that Blair had said these things in a
meeting, an "eyes only" cable was dispatched from the State Department
to Ambassador Stapleton Roy at the embassy in Jakarta. The thrust of
this cable was that what Blair had done was unacceptable and that it
must be reversed. As a result of that cable from Washington to Roy, a
corrective phone call was arranged between General Wiranto and Admiral
Blair. That call took place on April 18.
I have the official report on that phone call, which was written by
Blair's aide, Lieut. Col. Tom Sidwell. According to the account of the
call and according to US military officials I spoke to, once again
Blair failed to tell Wiranto to shut the militias down. In fact, Blair
instead permitted Wiranto to make, in essence, a political speech
saying the same thing he had said before. Here is one passage from the
account: "General Wiranto denies that TNI and the police supported any
one group during the incidents"--meaning during the military attacks.
"General Wiranto will go to East Timor tomorrow to emphasize three
things:...Timorese, especially the two disputing groups, to solve the
problem peacefully with dialogue; 2) encourage the militia to disarm;
3) make the situation peaceful and solve the problem." At no point did
Blair demand that the militias be shut down, and in fact this call was
followed by escalating militia violence and increases in concrete, new
US military assistance to Indonesia, including the sending in of a US
Air Force trainer just weeks ago to train the Indonesian Air Force.
Emphasis added. Panetta has no experience and Blair has ethical conflicts, can't/doesn't know how to follow directions, and somehow manages to convey the opposite of what he's supposed to be saying.
I'm not saying I'm worried about our intelligence, but somehow, I don't see the capture of OBL or the dismantling of Al Qaeda in the near future either.